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Abstract: This paper uses variation induced by firm closures to explore the 
intergenerational effects of worker displacement.  Using a Canadian panel of 
administrative data that follows almost 60,000 father-child pairs from 1978 to 1999 and 
includes detailed information about the firms at which the father worked, we construct 
narrow treatment and control groups whose fathers had the same level of permanent 
income prior to 1982 when some of the fathers were displaced.  We demonstrate that job 
loss leads to large permanent reductions in family income and small increases in mobility 
and divorce. Comparing outcomes among individuals whose fathers experienced an 
employment shock to outcomes among individuals whose fathers did not, we find that 
children whose fathers were displaced have annual earnings about 9% lower than similar 
children whose fathers did not experience an employment shock.  They are also more 
likely to receive unemployment insurance and social assistance.  The estimates are driven 
by the experiences of children whose family income was at the bottom of the income 
distribution, and are robust to a number of specification checks.     
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  It is well known that children from affluent families tend to have higher incomes as 
adults than children who grow up in poor families (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992).  This pattern 
has convinced many social scientists and policymakers that family income plays an important 
role in determining children’s life chances.  Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), for example, 
suggest that raising the incomes of poor families “…will enhance the cognitive development of 
children and may improve their chances of success in the labor market during adulthood.”  Policy 
discussions often invoke the legacy of growing up in a poor family as evidence of the potential 
effectiveness of income transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
Despite such claims, the process that generates the intergenerational income correlation is not 
well understood.  One possibility is that differences in income lead to differences in parents’ 
monetary investments in their children.  It is just as likely, however, that differences in income 
reflect differences in innate parental characteristics that parents pass onto their children. 
  Certainly, the magnitude of the intergenerational correlation is hard to ignore.  Solon’s 
(1999) survey of the intergenerational mobility literature suggests that the correlation between 
fathers’ and sons’ earnings is about 0.4.  At issue is the extent to which this correlation reflects 
the importance of monetary vs. non-monetary family background characteristics.  High income 
parents are likely to have other attributes such as high ability or motivation that independently 
have a positive affect on their children’s outcomes.  Cross-sectional comparisons of individuals 
who grew up in families with different income levels are thus likely to overstate the degree to 
which family resources matter.   
  This paper examines the effect of firm closings on the next generation’s outcomes.
1 
Jacobsen, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) (henceforth, JLS) and Stevens (1997) have documented 
that workers displaced by such events experience substantive long-lasting reductions in earnings, 
and they argue that firm closings can be thought of as exogenous employment shocks after 
conditioning on pre-displacement earnings.  Our estimation strategy constructs narrow treatment 
                                                 
1 When we include mass layoffs in our treatment group we obtain very similar results.   2
and control groups of individuals whose fathers had the same levels of permanent income prior to 
1982 when some of the fathers were displaced, and worked in firms of similar size and industry.   
Like previous studies, we demonstrate that displacement leads to permanent reductions in family 
income.  
Comparing outcomes among individuals whose fathers experienced an employment 
shock to outcomes among individuals whose fathers did not, we find that children whose fathers 
were displaced have annual earnings that are about 9% lower than similar children whose fathers 
did not experience an employment shock.  They are also more likely to receive unemployment 
insurance and social assistance.  The estimates are driven by the experiences of children whose 
family income was at the bottom of the income distribution.  The results suggest that the long 
term consequences of unexpected job loss extend beyond the effect on one’s own income to the 
eventual labor market outcomes of one’s children. 
 
I. Background 
  Understanding which factors contribute to the intergenerational transmission of income is 
crucial to the development of successful public policies.  In the United States there are a number 
of programs designed to help low-income children, including Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families, Medicaid, Head Start, Food Stamps, and public education.  Some of these involve 
income transfers whereas others are direct-intervention programs.   Mayer (1997) notes that 
throughout the history of the United States social policy has swung back and forth between the 
belief that material deprivation is the primary reason that poor children have poor outcomes, and 
the belief that parental characteristics that contribute to low incomes are mostly responsible for 
poor children’s failure.  Informed social policy depends critically on understanding which of 
these beliefs is correct.  If, for example, money is a key determinant of children’s outcomes then 
the effects of policies on family income should be a central consideration when evaluating their 
costs and benefits.  On the other hand, if children’s outcomes are mostly determined by innate   3
parental characteristics that are correlated with income then social policy should be less 
concerned with income redistribution and focus more on addressing deficits in the other 
characteristics. 
  A number of cross-sectional studies show that positive income correlations remain even 
after controlling for a variety of parental characteristics (e.g. Corcoran et. al, 1992; Duncan and 
Hill, 1987), but these correlations are likely to overstate the degree to which parental income 
matters if some parental attributes that are positively correlated with income and children’s 
outcomes cannot be observed.   It is difficult to find compelling variation in income that is 
unrelated to parental characteristics that might affect child development (Duncan and Brooks-
Gunn, 1997; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).  Shea (2000), for example, uses cross-sectional 
variation in fathers’ earnings due to union status, industry wage differentials and involuntary job 
loss to identify the effects of parental income, but other researchers (Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Lee, 1978) have argued that wage differences associated with these job 
characteristics reflect workers’ innate attributes.  Dahl and Lochner (2004) also create an 
instrument for income that includes family background characteristics (as well as changes in 
income induced by the Earned Income Tax Credit).
2  Mayer (1997) controls for unobserved 
parental characteristics by adding to her regression a measure of parental income taken after the 
child’s outcome is observed.  She argues that future income is exogenous with respect to a 
previously measured outcome, so that it can serve as a proxy for the unmeasured components of 
family background.  The success of this strategy requires that parental investment when the child 
is still at home is not influenced by the anticipation of future income, however.  Blau (1999), 
Duncan, et. al. (1998) and Levy and Duncan (1999) all compare outcomes across siblings with 
different age-specific family income levels, but this approach can only identify the effect of 
                                                 
2 The extent to which Dahl and Lochner’s identification is driven by the EITC vs. these other family 
background characteristics is unclear to us.     4
transitory changes in family income and it has been well documented that permanent income has 
a much stronger relationship with children’s long-term outcomes (Solon, 1999).
3   
  Most existing studies that explore the effects of family resources on offspring’s outcomes 
have been based on longitudinal datasets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth, which are relatively small.  It has turned out to be difficult 
to precisely identify parental income effects with so little data.  The confidence interval around 
Shea’s IV estimate of the effect of father’s earnings on children’s earnings, for example, includes 
effects ranging from approximately  -30% to 30%.  Solon’s (1999) comparison of sibling and 
intergenerational earnings correlations suggests that no more than 40% of the similarity in 
brothers’ outcomes is likely due to factors related to their parents’ income. While this leaves open 
the possibility that family income plays an important role in children’s development it also 
suggests that when the data are limited to only a few thousand observations the effect may not be 
strong enough to estimate precisely. 
  This paper makes several contributions to the growing literature on intergenerational 
income mobility.  First, by exploiting variation that is induced by firm closings, we can separate 
the effect of a long-lasting income shock from the effect of innate parental attributes.  While 
cross-sectional differences in fathers’ labor market characteristics are likely to reflect individual 
attributes, our longitudinal data allow us to construct narrow groups of “treatment” and “control” 
children whose families look identical before 1982, when some of the fathers lost their jobs.  We 
base our analysis on a sample of children whose fathers worked continuously for the same firm 
between 1978 and 1981, and control for average family income, regional location, industry, and 
                                                 
3 A very different approach is taken by Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) who use long-run trends in earnings 
levels at different points in the U.S. earnings distribution (and in different geographic regions) to generate 
exogenous income variation.  They find that demographic groups with more sharply rising incomes also 
experienced larger increases in their children’s educational attainment.  One puzzle with these results is 
that, in their preferred specification, the return to education has no significant effect on college enrollment 
decisions.  This may reflect the fact that their framework makes it difficult to control for both the current 
return to education and the change in parental income, since both are driven by the same national trends in 
returns to skill.  The rise in return to skill should affect children’s education directly, and so their strategy 
may not provide a valid instrument for changes in parental income.   5
firm size during those four years.  Thus, we are able to compare outcomes across children whose 
families would likely have had the same level of permanent income if the treatment fathers had 
not been displaced.  A second advantage of our study is that it makes use of a longitudinal 
dataset that contains earnings and income observations on almost 60,000 father-son pairs.  The 
sheer magnitude of this dataset substantially increases the precision with which intergenerational 
relationships can be estimated.   
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
  We conduct our analysis in two stages.  In the first stage, we use methods developed in 
the displacement literature to demonstrate that displacement has a substantive and long-lasting 
effect on a family’s resources.  The purpose of this part of the analysis is to make a convincing 
case that displacement produces an exogenous shock to family income.  In the second stage, we 
use this information to identify the intergenerational effect of a family income shock. 
 
II.A. Estimating the Effect of Displacement on a Family’s Resources 
  We begin by following the empirical strategy introduced by JLS, and demonstrate that 
displacement has a large, persistent effect on a family’s monetary resources.  We start by 
regressing annual measures of family income, father’s income and father’s earnings on a full set 
of father’s age fixed effects and a set of province by year dummy variables.
4  The residual from 
this regression provides an annual estimate of family resources that is purged of life-cycle effects, 
province specific business-cycle effects and province-specific trends in earnings. We then regress 
this residual on a set of dummy variables indicating whether the father left his firm because the 
firm closed in a current, future or previous year.  Specifically, given longitudinal data on fathers’ 
labor market experiences, the effect of displacement on a family’s resources is modeled in the 
following way: 
                                                 
4 The province fixed effect is determined in the initial year the father is observed (1978).   6
ipt i ipt ipt u D I + + = α δ ln       ( 1 )  
where ln Iipt is the log of the residual of  family i’s resources  in province p and year t, and Dipt is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating that a displacement has taken (or will take)  place in a 
future, current, or previous year.  The error term has two components, a family-specific fixed 
effect, i α , and a random component,  ipt u . Since the model includes fixed effects, individual 
characteristics that do not vary over time, such as race and education, are not included.   
The vector of displacement indicators (Dipt) contains three types of variables: dummy 
variables that equal one in the years prior to the displacement, a dummy variable equal to one in 
the year that the father loses his job, and a series of dummy variables indicating that a 
displacement took place in a previous year.  The first set of indicator variables captures the 
possibility that the father’s wages may begin to deteriorate prior to the actual displacement.  This 
might happen if wages are cut when the firm hits difficult times:  failure to include these 
dummies would lead to a biased estimate of the effect of the displacement.  Our model, therefore, 
includes a dummy variable for each of the three years before the job loss occurs.  The dummy 
variable indicating the year of the displacement captures its immediate effect on family resources, 
whereas the coefficients on the set of variables indicating that a displacement occurred in a 
previous year will reflect the persistence of the displacement effect over time.  We follow the 
post-displacement period for eight years, including a dummy variable indicating that eight or 
more years have elapsed since the displacement took place.  An eight year reduction in family 
resources comprises a significant fraction of the time a child is growing up, though most of the 
children in our sample will no longer be living at home at the end of the eight year period. 
  The error term in the above equation contains a time-invariant family-specific effect,  i α , 
which measures average resources net of displacement.  By including this fixed effect, we are 
able to separate variation in resources that is likely to be correlated with unobserved parental 
characteristics from variation due to a random shock.  At the same time, the series of   7
displacement dummies allows us to trace out the economic consequences in each year following 
the job loss and to estimate both the short-term and long-term effects, which may differ. 
  As will be discussed in Section III.B. the results from this exercise show that 
displacement substantively reduces family resources for many years.  In order to facilitate our 
subsequent analyses, we will also estimate the effect of displacement using a version of equation 
(1) that replaces the individual fixed effect with the average of family income between 1978 and 
1980 (which is at least two years before any displacements occur) and replaces the vector of 
displacement dummies with a single indictor for whether or not a displacement has occurred in 
the last five years or will occur in the next two years:   
ipt ipt ipt u AvgInc Shock I + + = −80 78 ln φ δ       ( 2 )  
where  AvgInc is the family’s (or father’s) average income or earnings between 1978 and 1980, 
and  Shock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a displacement occurs during the displacement 
window described above.  The coefficient on the Shock dummy indicates the average effect of 
displacement on family income over the years we study.  The estimates produced by equations 1-
2 will inform us about the magnitude and persistence of the economic losses that result from 
displacement. 
 
II.B. Estimating the Effect of Displacement on Children’s Outcomes   
  After documenting that job loss leads to a large, persistent decline in resources, we next 
use information about whether a child’s father lost his job to identify the effect of an income 
shock on children’s long-term economic outcomes.  In this part of our analysis, we regress a 
measure of the child’s economic well-being on average family income between 1978 and 1980 
and the Shock dummy.  
i i i cShock bAvgInc a O ε + + + = −80 78        ( 3 )    8
where  i O  represents an economic outcome for child i.   Thus we compare outcomes across 
children whose parents experienced a job loss to outcomes for those whose parents did not, 
controlling for family income in the pre-displacement years.  We also include a number of 
additional firm, region, and industry control variables that will be discussed in the next section.  
The key to this identification strategy is the assumption that after conditioning on fathers with 
similar income, in similar firms, industries, and regions, the families that experienced a 
displacement were ex ante no different from those who did not. 
 
III. Data 
  Our analysis is based on data from the Intergenerational Income Database (IID), which is 
maintained by the Family and Labour Studies Division of Statistics Canada.  The IID links tax 
information on children born between 1963 and 1970 to data on their parents, for all years 
between 1978 and 1999.  The links were made possible using the T1 Family File (T1FF) of the 
Small Area and Administrative Data Division of Statistics Canada.  
   The T1FF is a data set of individual tax records that has been processed in a way that 
matches members of each tax filer’s family.  The primary way in which children are matched to 
their parents is through their name and address.  In order to be identified as living in the same 
family, the child must file from the same address as the parent at least once during a five year 
period beginning when the child is 16-19 years of age.  Evidence presented in Oreopolous (2003) 
suggests that this matching process picks up most adolescents in Canada.  Younger children are 
more likely to be living at home, but less likely to file a tax return.
5 All Canadians must file a tax 
return if they pay income tax in that year, and if they claim unemployment insurance benefits, a 
nonrefundable tuition tax credit or the monthly deduction for enrollment in a full-time education 
program.  Since a child need only file once over a five year period in order to be included in the 
                                                 
5 Note that a child may live away from home but still file from a parent’s address, and thus be included in 
the IID.  Children who are away at college fall into this category.   9
sample, the vast majority of children make it into the IID.  From the 1981 Canadian census, 96 
percent of 17 year olds lived with a parent and 53 percent received non-transfer income in the 
previous year.  Over 80 percent of 20 year olds lived with a parent, for and 73 percent of them 
received non-transfer income.  Oreopoulos reports that the database includes 72 percent of youth 
who were 16-19 in 1982, 1984 or 1986 (the years in which the matches took place). 
  One way of exploring the representativeness of our sample is to compare the income 
distribution for children later in life to the income distribution for the same cohorts in the Census.  
Figure 1 plots 1995 income distributions for 25-33 year olds in the IID and the 1996 Census.  It is 
clear that the IID misses a fraction of children who ultimately end up at the low end of the income 
distribution.  In Section IV, we show that this is the group for whom our results are strongest, 
however, so it is likely that, if anything, this omission biases our estimates towards zero.   
We have also examined whether there are differences in family size between those 
households with fathers who worked in firms that closed vs. those that did not.  If there is 
selection into our treatment and control groups we might expect to see a correlation between 
family size (based on the number of children matching to the parents) and the corresponding 
father’s displacement category.  We do not find this.  In 1982, the average number of children 
aged 12 to 19 per family is 1.81 among those whose fathers are classified as displaced, and 1.82 
among those whose fathers are not.  
  The IID provides detailed administrative data on the incomes of children and their 
matched parents from 1978 to 1999.  It also includes information on their age, gender, marital 
status, family composition, and residential address as well as an identification number for the firm 
at which the individual is employed.  This ID number is used to match fathers in the IID to 
information about their firms from Statistics Canada’s Longitudinal Employment Analysis 
Program database (LEAP).  LEAP is a company-level database that includes all employers in 
Canada, both corporate and unincorporated.  The database tracks the employment and payroll   10
characteristics of individual firms from their year of entry to their year of exit.
6  Employers in 
Canada are required to register a payroll deduction account and issue a T4 slip to each employee 
that summarizes earnings received in a given fiscal year.  The LEAP database includes every 
business that issues a T4 taxation slip. 
Only those already in the IID are matched to the LEAP firm identification number.  Firm 
size is calculated as the number of fathers in the same firm in a given year.  An internal match to 
the full LEAP database at Statistics Canada indicates the average ratio between total firm size and 
total father firm size for firms identified in the IID is 9.9.  Thus, on average, the IID contains 
approximately a one-in-ten (non-random) sample of all employees in firms matched in both the 
IID and the LEAP database.  Our sample also includes a 3 digit industry code for each firm and 
province location of firm’s head office.   
The longitudinal nature of the matched IID allows firm entry and exit to be identified on 
an annual basis.  A firm closure is assigned in a given year if there are no IID fathers working at 
the firm in any following year (through 1999).
7  In order to distinguish true closures from 
company reorganizations that lead to new identification codes, however, we do not count a firm 
as being closed if 35% or more of its workers move to the same “new” firm.
8 
9  
Our main sample is limited to individuals who were between the ages of 12 and 14 in 
1982.  Information on older children is available in the IID, but we do not include these children 
because they are likely to have left home shortly after the displacement occurred.  Information on 
                                                 
6 Self-employed persons who do not draw a salary are not included on the LEAP database.  In addition, 
businesses comprised solely of individuals or partnerships who do not draw a salary are also excluded from 
the LEAP. 
7 This may lead to some misclassifications.  For example, if a firm disappears in 1983, we will identify the 
closing year as 1982.  In some cases, the firm may have closed early enough in 1983 that it did not file T-4 
slips. 
8 We examined the sensitivity of the results around this threshold using alternative values of 15 and 50 
percent.  Coefficient estimates for the main tables were similar.  The standard errors were somewhat larger 
for the 15 percent threshold.  
9 We also explored displacement through mass layoffs.  Identifying mass-layoffs is more difficult than firm 
closures because we can only observe what fraction of the firm leaves in between years, and this fraction 
depends on the firm’s size.  Firms can choose who leaves and for this reason we chose to focus on firm 
closures.    11
younger children is not available.  Children whose fathers are missing tax data are eliminated 
because without the tax data we cannot observe fathers’ earnings, place of employment or labor 
market status.  This restriction reduces the sample of fathers by about 11 percent.  We also restrict 
the sample to children whose fathers were between the ages of 30 and 50 in 1978.  This ensures 
that we are focusing on fathers whose incomes would have been relatively stable:  earnings of 
young workers tend to be more volatile than those of workers who are over 30, and Stevens 
(1997) shows that the long-term effects of displacement are largest for workers with more years 
of tenure.  
We also restrict our main sample to fathers who are initially working at firms that 
employed between 2 and 500 men (in the IID).  We require that the firm employ at least 2 fathers 
because one-father firms will include self-employed fathers, and in order to reduce the possibility 
of mislabeling as displaced, men who voluntarily left small firms.  An upper bound of 500 is 
chosen because closures at larger firms are extremely rare, and we were concerned that including 
such firms would introduce heterogeneity across the treatments and controls.  Wage premiums are 
associated with large firms.  Finally, we eliminate children whose fathers earned more than 
$1,000,000 (measured in 1999 dollars) in a single year, in order to be sure that our estimates are 
not driven by outliers. 
The treatment group consists of 12 to 14 year olds whose fathers experienced a 
displacement in 1982.  Our primary control group consists of individuals whose fathers stayed 
with the firm through 1982, but who may have left after that.  Fifty-six percent of fathers in this 
control group remained at the same firm until at least 1988.  As part of our sensitivity analysis, 
we explore the consequences of including early leavers in our sample.  We also show that the 
early exit rate (before 1982) is not correlated with closure in 1982, a finding similar to that of 
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). 
  Our analysis focuses on the effects of displacements that occurred in 1982.  Choosing this 
date allows us to base our sample on the children of fathers who had at least four years of tenure   12
at the firm, while maximizing the number of years the children would be likely to be living at 
home after the displacement occurs.  Another advantage of focusing on displacements that 
occurred in 1982 is that it was the beginning of a substantial and prolonged recession in Canada 
so that the number of displacement events is high. 
      The IID includes information on three socioeconomic outcomes: earnings, receipt of 
unemployment benefits, and receipt of social assistance.   We use information that is available 
between 1995 and 1999 to create three dependent variables:  the log of a five-year earnings 
average, an indicator for whether the individual received unemployment insurance during the five 
year period, and an indicator for whether the individual received social assistance during the five 
year period.  Since earnings generally increase with age, we adjust our earnings measure by 
regressing it on a set of age dummies and use the residual as our dependent variable.  
  
IV. Results 
IV.A. Summary Statistics 
  Sample summary statistics are shown in Table 1.  Appendix Table A.1 includes 
additional information about the firms in our sample.  As described above, most of our analysis 
focuses on children whose fathers were employed at firms with between 2 and 500 fathers.  Our 
sample contains 54,145 fathers, 1,541 of whom experienced a firm closure in 1982.  These men 
worked at 14,857 different firms, 509 of which closed during 1982.
10   Control fathers remained 
with the same firm between 1978 and 1982.   
  Table 1 shows separate statistics for our treatment and control groups.  Fathers’ average 
age, income and earnings are initially very similar across the two groups, but by 1988, six years 
after treatment fathers have lost their jobs, the labor market characteristics of the two groups are 
                                                 
10 The control group in the main sample may include fathers displaced after 1982.  The fraction of 
displaced workers in the control, however, is likely to be small.  We also considered an alternative control 
group that remained in the same firm between 1978 and 1988 and produced similar results with this group 
than with the control group we use here.  The control group in our main sample is free to leave old and 
enter new firms, whether such a move occurs for positive or negative reasons.   13
quite different.   Average earnings of displaced fathers are roughly $43,000, while the average 
earnings of the control fathers are roughly $49,000.  Not surprisingly, the displaced fathers are 
also much more likely to be receiving unemployment insurance.
11     Table 1 thus provides some 
initial evidence that firm closings generate substantial shocks to a family’s economic status.  At 
the same time, these shocks do not appear to affect other family background characteristics:    
fathers’ marital status and mothers’ income, for example are very similar for the treatment and 
control groups in both 1978 and 1988. 
Table 1 also shows that treatment and control children have somewhat different labor 
market outcomes.  For example, average earnings between 1995 and 1998 are about $21,000 
among those whose fathers experienced a job loss and $23,000 for those whose fathers did not.  
Similarly, treatment children have higher rates of UI and SA receipt than the controls. 
The last column of Table 1 provides these descriptive statistics for all individuals in the 
IID who were 12-14 years old in 1982.   Average family income is comparable, though slightly 
higher for these children.  Otherwise, the samples are very similar.   
 
IV.B. The Monetary Costs of Displacement 
  In this section we document that displacement leads to a substantive long-term reduction  
in family resources.  We begin by graphing the average earnings trajectories of treatment and 
control fathers.  Our earnings measure is the residual from a regression of earnings on age and 
province/year fixed effects, which allows us to abstract from life-cycle trends and province-
specific business cycles.  Figure 2A makes clear that prior to 1982 the two groups experienced 
virtually identical earnings trajectories, lending weight to our hope that the treatment and control 
children come from similar backgrounds.  At the same time we see that displacement produces a 
large and persistent shock to earnings. Both of these findings are necessary to our identification 
strategy.   Figure 2B tells a similar story.  Here we plot kernel density estimates of the earnings 
                                                 
11 Information on social assistance receipt is not available prior to 1992.   14
distributions for the two groups.    The distributions are very similar prior to 1982, but after 1982 
the distribution among displaced fathers is shifted substantially to the left.   
  We see a similar pattern when we look at receipt of UI (Figure 2C).
 12  As expected, 
displaced fathers experience a spike in benefit receipt in 1982, and by 1983, almost 40 percent of 
displaced father’s are receiving UI benefits.  UI use falls thereafter, but gradually, and never to 
the average levels of the non-displaced group.  We also note that UI receipt rises in 1982 and 
1983 among the control fathers.  Some of these fathers may have been displaced from firms that 
did not meet our definition of a closure, or they may have claimed UI without being laid off.       
  Table 2 presents the results from our regressions of fathers’ annual earnings and income 
on the displacement dummies.  Columns 1 through 3 show estimates based on equation (1) using 
father’s earnings, father’s income, and parental income as the dependent variables.  Like previous 
studies, we find that family resources decline substantially when a job loss occurs.  For example, 
in the year following a job loss, father’s earnings fall by 30%, father’s income falls by 19%, and 
parental income falls by 13%.
13 
14  Family resources recover somewhat over time, but even 8 
years later earnings are approximately 15% lower than they would have been if the displacement 
had not occurred.  Similarly, the two income measures are reduced by 8 and 9 percent.  These 
estimates are all statistically significant, and indicate that displacement produces substantive and 
persistent economic losses.   They are similar to the estimates produced by JLS. 
The first 3 rows of Table 2 also show what happens to family resources in the years prior 
to the displacement.  As foreshadowed in Figure 1, there is no evidence that earnings or income 
begin to deteriorate prior to the job loss.  The coefficient estimates are small and precisely 
estimated.  This suggests that pre-displacement income can be included in our subsequent 
analysis as a control for permanent income. 
                                                 
12 UI receipt is zero between 1978-1981, when the father was working at the same firm.   
13 The percentage effect on earnings is computed as  . 1 −
δ e  
14 A firm closure can occur anytime during the year.  The fathers in our sample may, therefore, lose their 
job anytime between early January and late December.  As a result, spells of unemployment and earnings 
losses may be larger in the year following the displacement than in the displacement year itself.     15
  The last three columns of Table 2 provide the estimates produced by estimation of 
equation (2).    This paired-down version of equation (1) summarizes the monetary effect of 
displacement in a single coefficient, which is convenient for the second stage of the analysis.   
Similar to the first three columns of the table, the estimates suggest that men who lost their jobs 
in 1982 experienced permanent reductions in earnings and income of about 14%.
15  
 
IV.C. Intergenerational Effects of Displacement 
  Having established that displacement substantially reduces family resources, we now 
investigate whether it produces intergenerational effects.  Table 3 displays the results from this 
second stage of our analysis.  Dependent variables include the log of average earnings between 
1995 and 1999, a dummy variable indicating whether the child filed for unemployment benefits 
between 1995 and 1999, and a dummy variable indicating whether she filed for social assistance 
between 1995 and 1999.  Column 1 shows the results produced by an OLS regression of the log 
of child’s earnings on the log of father’s income between 1978 and 1980.   Sample variation in 
this variable is likely to reflect variation in other family background characteristics though Figure 
1 suggests that characteristics correlated with family income are unlikely to differ much between 
the treatment and control children.  The estimated coefficient of 0.38 is consistent with the 
intergenerational correlations literature, which generally finds that the correlation between 
American fathers’ and sons’ earnings is about 0.40.
16  
                                                 
15 The estimates presented in Table 2 could be biased if displaced workers have unobserved characteristics 
that not only lower their earnings levels, but also their rate of earnings growth.  In order to address this 
concern, we have also re-estimated equation (1) including father-specific time trends (equation 2).    The 
results are very similar.  Since the inclusion of person-specific trends does not appear to alter our estimates, 
we exclude these trends from the rest of our analyses.  
16 The correlation is significantly higher than that estimated for Canada by Corak and Heisz (1999).  Some 
of the difference can be explained by our more selective sample of fathers in medium-sized firms for at 
least 5 years.  Our correlation falls to 0.35 without this selection.  Our correlation further reduces to 0.30 
when keeping only sons and daughters aged 29 to 31 (which corresponds to Corak and Heisz’ sample), and 
falls further to 0.28 when only looking at sons.  Corak and Heisz find a correlation of about 0.25.   16
  In the next column we include only a dummy variable indicating whether the father lost 
his job due to a plant closing.  This variable has a powerful effect on the child’s earnings, which 
are 8% lower than the earnings of those whose fathers were not displaced.   Remarkably, this 
estimate barely changes even when we control for father’s pre-1981 income (column 3).   
Furthermore, the point estimate on the log of pre-1981 income is robust to the inclusion of the 
displacement dummy.  Taken together, these results suggest that our treatment and control groups 
are well-matched. 
  Column 4 adds firm-level controls to our model, including a quartic in father’s firm size, 
the median wage, and 11 industry fixed effects.  If the inclusion of these controls alters the 
estimated displacement coefficient then we should be concerned about the possible influence of 
family background characteristics. We also include 36 dummies indicating region of residence 
and urban/rural status, since firm closings that occur in company towns may have long lasting 
effects on local labor market conditions (Flint, Michigan comes to mind).  If individuals tend to 
stay in the same location where they grew up then the displacement coefficient may partly reflect 
the fact that firm closings depress wages in the local economy.   The estimated displacement 
coefficient is not changed by the addition of these controls, however.  Furthermore, the estimates 
are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects that capture even more finely defined industry 
categories, such as at the three digit industry level.   
  The remainder of Table 3 shows what happens when we replace the dependent variable 
with indicators for whether the child received unemployment benefits or social assistance.  These 
specifications also suggest that children whose parents experienced a job loss have worse 
economic outcomes than those whose parents did not.  We find that children whose fathers were 
displaced are two percentage points more likely to receive unemployment benefits (though this is 
not statistically significant), and 3 percentage points more likely to receive social assistance as 
adults than those whose fathers remained at the same firm through 1982.  The mean level of 
social assistance receipt in the second generation is 0.10, so this estimated effect is very large.   17
We have also repeated the analysis separately for boys and girls.  While the results are 
not shown, they are very similar to those for the full sample, though the point estimates for girls 
are much less precisely estimated.  The noisiness of the girls’ estimates is undoubtedly driven by 
the fact that many women in their 20’s and 30’s choose not to work, or to work fewer hours while 
they are raising children, and not because they have poor labor market options.  Women with no 
earnings between 1995 and 1999 are not observed. 
  Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the base line results from including more detailed region 
and industry fixed effects at the time of displacement.  These estimates explore whether the main 
results simply capture local or region-specific shocks that affect everyone in these categories, not 
just those displaced.  The analysis focuses on displacement effects within detailed region-industry 
groups.  Keeping observations where at least one displaced father is matched to another non-
displaced father within a region-industry category produced similar results. 
The baseline estimates for the intergenerational effects of displacement on earnings, 
unemployment receipt, and social assistance receipt are shown again in columns 1, 4, and 7 
respectively.  These results include 1-digit initial industry and initial province by urban-rural 
status fixed effects.  The second set of columns (2, 5, and 8) include 317 3-digit industry 
categories.  The estimated displacement effect increases slightly from -.086 to -.103 (while the 
standard error increases slightly).  If we further condition on 180 local regions by controlling for 
the first 2-alphanumeric digits of the father’s postal code of initial residence, the point estimate 
stays about the same, at -.094, although the effect is significant only at the 10 percent level.  The 
coefficients from estimating the displacement effects separately by fathers in rural or urban 
(Census Metropolitan Areas) also leads to similar point estimates.  
  The fall in annual income for children appears too large to attribute solely to the decline 
in family income from displacement.  Table 2 suggests that the average effect of father’s 
displacement on his own log earnings is approximately .14.  The corresponding reduction in the 
second generation’s earnings is about .08.  This would imply that a one dollar reduction in   18
father’s permanent earnings leads to a subsequent reduction in his son’s earnings of 34 cents.  
This is a very large effect, although the standard error estimate is also large. 
  Job loss is likely to impact the family in other ways than on income.  Displacement 
disrupts the routine of everyday family life and may increase feelings of stress and anxiety.   
Spouses may try to compensate for the loss in income by working more.  Lower income levels or 
subsequent re-employment could also be associated with residential moves, which are thought to 
have a negative impact on children (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994).  We explore some of these 
possibilities in Table 5 by estimating the effects of displacement on father’s marital status and 
unemployment, mother’s earnings, and residential mobility. We can also examine whether the 
inclusion of these variables affects the estimated effect of displacement on children’s outcomes.   
  Column 1 provides, at best, weak evidence that fathers who lost their jobs are more likely 
to be divorced than fathers who did not lose their jobs.  Two years after a firm closure, treatment 
fathers are 1.5 percentage points more likely to have divorced than control fathers, but the gap 
soon disappears, as the divorce rate among the control group rises for other reasons.  We find 
stronger evidence of effects of displacement on residential mobility.  Compared to children whose 
fathers are able to keep their jobs, displaced children are about 4 percentage points more likely to 
have moved in the short run and about 2 percentage points more likely to move in the long run. 
Unemployment insurance use is clearly higher among fathers displaced in 1982, even 8 years 
later.  There is no evidence of a change in mother’s earnings following the father’s displacement. 
  Table 6 shows that divorce and residential mobility do not seem to explain any part of the 
displacement effects we estimate.  Here we report results of regressions of kid’s outcomes on 
family income prior to the job loss, the displacement dummy, and indicators for whether the 
parents divorce or move.  The displacement effects are very similar to those shown in Table 3, 
suggesting that they are not driven by either divorce or residential mobility in the aftermath of 
displacement.    19
  An alternative way of investigating the possibility that our displacement effects are 
generated by factors unrelated to income is to add the log of average earnings between 1982 and 
1988 to our basic specification: 
i i i Shock AvgInc AvgInc O ε β β β β + + + + = − − 4 88 82 3 80 78 2 1  .  (4) 
The estimates of 3 β  and  4 β allow us to separate the displacement effect into an income 
component and a part that is unrelated to income.  The results of this exercise, which are 
displayed in Table 7, suggest that the displacement effect is driven almost entirely by changes in 
income.  The inclusion of post-displacement income leads to a dramatic fall in the estimated 
displacement coefficient, which is no longer statistically different from zero.  At the same time, 
the estimated effect of post-displacement income on child’s earnings is substantive.  One needs to 
be careful in interpreting this coefficient because differences in father’s 1983-1988 income, 
controlling for displacement, may be driven by variation in unobserved characteristics.  The 
estimates in Table 7, however, are not consistent with a large portion of the displacement effects 
being driven by non-monetary factors. 
  Next, we consider how the displacement effects vary across the income distribution.   
Since the financial constraints and associated stress that accompany a job loss are likely to be 
larger for low income families, we expect that the intergenerational displacement effects will be 
largest for individuals who grew up in less affluent families.
17  An advantage of basing our 
analysis on such a large dataset is that we can investigate this issue directly.  In Table 8 we 
present displacement estimates separately by the family’s (initial) income quartile.  The 
displacement effects appear to be concentrated among those families for whom father’s earnings 
are in the lowest quartile.   Among children in this group subsequent earnings are 17% lower than 
they would have been if the father had not been displaced, and the probability of social assistance 
                                                 
17 For example, Coelli (2004) finds that low income teenagers whose parents experience a job loss are less 
likely to attend college, and virtually all of this affect is concentrated among parents with only a high 
school education or less   20
and UI receipt are 4 and 6 percentage points higher.  In contrast, there is no evidence that there is 
any intergenerational effect among families in the top two quartiles.  This finding may provide 
some insight as to why previous studies have failed to find income effects on the next generation:  
small sample sizes make it difficult to estimate nonlinear effects, yet virtually all of the action 
appears to be at the bottom of the income distribution. 
   
IV.D. Robustness Checks 
  In the remainder of the paper we discuss several exercises that are designed to examine 
the sensitivity of our results to model specification and variable definitions.  First, we investigate 
whether job losses that occur after children have left home have the same intergenerational effects 
as those that occur when the children are younger.   A father’s displacement should have a 
smaller psychological and financial effect on individuals who are no longer living in the 
household, so estimates of the same magnitude may be a sign that the displacement coefficient is 
picking up the effects of unobserved family background characteristics.   
  We investigate this possibility by aging our sample of children to 1989 and estimating the 
intergenerational effects of parental displacements that occur in that year.   By 1989 our sample 
of children is between the ages of 19 and 21 and should be less sensitive to a parental job loss.  In 
Table 9 we see the results from this exercise.   Labor market outcomes are measured for the same 
cohorts of children whom we followed in Table 3, but by 1989 these children were 19-21 years 
old.  As in Table 3, children’s earnings and benefit receipt are measured between 1995 and 1999.   
Unlike Table 3, however, we see no evidence that parental job loss affects the next generation’s 
outcomes:  the estimated coefficient on the displacement variable is 0.008, which is dramatically 
lower than the estimated displacement effect at younger ages, and it is not statistically different 
from zero.     Similarly, the estimated effect on children’s social assistance receipt is not 
statistically significant.  This finding is particularly noteworthy because father’s earnings losses 
following a 1989 displacement are even larger than those following a job loss in 1982: fathers   21
who were displaced in 1989 experience short term earnings declines that are nearly double those 
experienced by fathers who lost their jobs in 1982.   
  Finally, we consider the possibility that our results are driven by heterogeneity across 
workers who leave firms before they close and those who are displaced at the time the firm shuts 
down.  Our sample includes the latter, but not the former.  One concern is that those who leave a 
firm before it closes are more able to obtain alternative jobs than those who stay until the firm 
shuts down.  In this case our estimates would reflect only the experiences of children whose 
fathers are least likely to recover from displacement.  We explore this possibility in Tables 10 and 
11, where we extend our sample to include children whose fathers left the firm after 1979.  Table 
10 compares demographic characteristics in 1978 for those fathers who left the firm before it shut 
down in 1982 to those who were displaced by the firm closure.  There is no evidence that “early 
leavers” have higher incomes, are of different ages, or have different marriage propensities than 
those who remain in the firm until it closes.  Table 11 shows the results of IV regressions in 
which we use an indicator for whether or not the firm closed in 1982 as an instrument for whether 
the father was displaced in 1982.   As we would expect, this instrument has strong predictive 
power:  the first stage coefficient estimate is highly significant, and indicates that working in a 
firm that closes in 1982 increases the probability of leaving the firm in 1982 by 80%.  Also as 
expected, the reduced form regressions (not shown) of the child’s outcome on whether the firm 
his father worked at in 1978 closed in 1982 produces smaller coefficient estimates than the 
estimated effects of displacement, but the IV estimates are of similar magnitude to those in Table 
3, and retain their statistical significance. 
      
V. Conclusions 
  This paper provides new evidence on the transmission of economic status across 
generations.  While the existence of large intergenerational income correlations has lead many 
researchers to conclude that family income is an important determinant of children’s eventual   22
economic success, the evidence in support of this hypothesis is surprisingly limited.  Previous 
research has been hampered by small sample sizes and the difficult task of controlling for 
unobserved parental attributes.   Because we exploit longitudinal variation that is induced by firm 
closings we are able to separate the effect of a long-lasting income shock from the effect of innate 
parental attributes.  Our access to a dataset that contains nearly 60,000 father/child pairs aids our 
ability to identify this effect. 
  We find that the adult earnings of children whose fathers were displaced are 8% lower 
than earnings of similar individuals whose fathers did not experience an employment shock, even 
after we account for fathers’ pre-displacement earnings, initial region of work, industry and firm 
size.  Relative to children whose fathers did not lose their jobs, children of displaced workers are 
also more likely to receive unemployment insurance and social assistance.  Our estimates are 
driven almost exclusively by the experiences of individuals whose family income during 
childhood was in the bottom quartile of the income distribution.  The results suggest that the long 
term consequences of unexpected job loss extend beyond the effect on one’s own income to the 
eventual labor market outcomes of one’s children. 
  The interpretation of these results relies on the quality of the control group.  Our analysis 
assumes that the labor market experiences of control fathers provide an appropriate counterfactual 
for what would have happened to the treatment fathers if the displacement had not occurred.  Put 
differently, we assume that conditional on 1978-1981 earnings and the other firm characteristic 
and region control variables, the likelihood that a job loss occurs is the same for the treatment and 
control groups.  The fact that pre-displacement labor market characteristics are virtually identical 
for the two groups is a promising sign that we have successfully controlled for innate family 
background characteristics, but if treatment and control families differ in ways that affect the 
second generation’s economic outcomes without affecting the economic outcomes of the parents, 
then our displacement effects will not be identified.  It is hard to imagine what such 
characteristics would be, however.   23
  Finally, it is important to note that our estimation strategy captures the full effect of 
displacement.  We have demonstrated that job loss leads to large, long lasting reductions in a 
family’s monetary resources, but it may also impose non-monetary costs (such as stress, or 
residential mobility) on the family that affect the children’s long-run outcomes.  If the non-
monetary costs of displacement are substantial, our results could overstate the effect of a pure 
income shock. Suggestive evidence points to income as the major avenue through which 
displacement affects families, however.   
  The intergenerational effects of displacement estimated here point to the possibility that, 
particularly among the lowest income families, lasting reductions in family income can have 
substantial negative effects on children.  This has not been a common finding in previous 
investigations of the causal link between parental income and children’s outcomes.  The 
qualitative difference between our findings and those in the earlier literature are likely to be 
related to three factors: our use of a large sample that allows for precise estimation of effects; the 
fact that displacement produces quite large and persistent reductions in family resources; and our 
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Figure 1 
Comparison of IID sample to 1986 Census 
Kernel densities for total income among 25-32 year olds in 1995   
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Figure 2A 
Annual Average Father’s Income 
by Whether Firm Worked at between 1978 and 1982 Closed in 1982 
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Annual Average of Unemployment Insurance Receipt  
by Whether Firm that Father Worked at between 1978 and 1982 Closed in 1982 
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Father in same firm, 78 - 82 Father's 78-82 firm Closes in 82Closures Controls All Children in IID
ages 12 to 14
Average Father Firmsize 15 14 15
(28) (34) (200)
Minimim Father Firmsize 2 2 1
Maximim Father Firmsize 493 496 27824
Average Median Wage  39,940 40,131 38,754
(11,971) (12,086) (15,815)
Province
Newfoundland 2.8 1.4 2.0
Prince Edward Island 0.6 0.6 0.6
Noval Scotia 2.6 3.0 3.6
New Brunswick 3.4 2.4 2.8
Quebec 31.2 32.0 30.9
Ontario 37.8 42.6 38.2
Manitoba 2.6 3.8 4.1
Saskatchewan 2.6 2.9 4.0
Alberta 12.5 7.3 8.9
British Columbia 4.2 4.1 5.0
1-Digit Industry
Missing 0.2 0.0 0.1
Agriculture 6.3 3.2 4.6
Primary Textiles and Leather 2.2 5.6 3.4
Clothing and Furniture 8.1 9.5 6.3
Manufacturing 10.4 14.4 8.9
Construction and Transportation 19.5 21.8 21.9
Wholesale Trade 9.2 12.7 10.6
Retail Trade 13.4 12.4 14.9
Finance and Insurance 15.9 8.8 9.6
Education and Health Services 5.1 4.4 9.1
Accomodation, Food and Bev. 9.8 7.3 10.6
Number of Firms 509 14,348 35,983
Table A.1
Descriptive Statistics, Firms
Note: Sample consists of all father-child pairs for which the child was between 
12 and 14 in 1982 and the father worked at a firm with between 2 and 500 
fathers in the IID.  Fathers must have worked at the same firm for four years 
(between 1978 and 1981) and received no unemployment insurance during that 
time.  The 'closures' sample includes fathers displaced from a firm that closes in 
1982.  Standard Deviations are in parenthesis.Closures Controls All Children in IID
Parents 1978
Father's Age 37 37 37
(5) (5) (5)
Father's Earnings 43,066 43,136 44,986
(16,905) (15,829) (16,839)
Father's Total Income 44,244 44,331 46,344
(15,827) (15,198) (16,077)
Father on UI 0.00 0.00 0.09
Father Married 0.95 0.96 0.95
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Mother's Earnings 7,971 7,756 8,067
(11,297) (11,479) (12,238)
Father Sample Size 1,541 52,604 165,325
Parents 1988
47 47 47
Father's Age (5) (5) (5)
42,760 49,355 49,379
Father's Earnings (31,199) (30,437) (45,499)
44,098 50,228 50,454
Father's Total Income (30,189) (58,664) (43,669)
0.16 0.09 0.10
Father on UI (0.37) (0.28) (0.30)
0.88 0.87 0.87
married (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
14,987 15,000 15,795
Mother's Total Income (15,683) (17,374) (18,090)
0.53 0.49 0.49
Moved from 1978 Address (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Children 1995-1999
Child's Earnings (95-99) 21,257   23,219 23,257
(14,820) (15,235) (15,187)
Child's Age 29.9 30.0 29.9
0.82 0.82 0.82
Child on UI at least once (95-99) 0.44 0.42 0.42
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Child on Welfare at least once (95-99) 0.13 0.10 0.10
(0.33) (0.30) (0.30)
Number of Children 1,718 57,963 176,930
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, Fathers and Children
Note: Sample consists of all father-child pairs for which the child was between 12 and 14 in 
1982 and the father worked at a firm with between 2 and 500 fathers in the IID.  Fathers mus
have worked at the same firm for four years (between 1978 and 1981) and received no 
unemployment insurance during that time.  The 'closures' sample includes fathers displaced 
from a firm that closes in 1982.  Standard Deviations are in parenthesis.Table 2
Effects of Displacement on Father's Real Log Earnings, Log Income and Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Log Father's Log Father's Log Parental Log Father's Log Father's Log Parenta
Displacement Earnings Income Income Earnings Income Income
Lead or Lag
-3 -0.005 0.012 0.016
[0.008] [0.027] [0.022]
-2 -0.001 0.006 0.017
[0.008] [0.028] [0.022]
-1 -0.005 0.01 0.01
[0.007] [0.027] [0.022]
0 -0.156 -0.085 -0.06
[0.011] [0.030] [0.023]
+1 -0.355 -0.208 -0.144
[0.019] [0.032] [0.024]
+2 -0.234 -0.202 -0.164
[0.015] [0.034] [0.027]
+3 -0.223 -0.192 -0.151
[0.015] [0.036] [0.028]
+4 -0.201 -0.157 -0.122
[0.019] [0.036] [0.028]
+5 -0.193 -0.165 -0.143
[0.018] [0.037] [0.030]
+6 -0.173 -0.118 -0.091
[0.018] [0.036] [0.028]
+7 -0.159 -0.13 -0.094
[0.020] [0.039] [0.030]
+8 -0.157 -0.108 -0.085
[0.019] [0.041] [0.031]
Log Income 1978-80 1.032 1.014 1.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Displacement -0.136 -0.132 -0.095
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 686,397 703,885 703,885 686,397 703,885 703,885
R-squared 0.55 0.59 0.49 0.33 0.39 0.19
Dependent Variable
Note: Columns 1 through 3 show regressions using as dependent variables log father's annual earnings 
and log total income (both demeaned by age and year).  The regressors are individual fixed effects and 
indicator variables for years since job displacement for fathers in firms that closed (the omitted category is 
not displaced or displacement in at least 3 years.  Columns 4 through 6 show results from regressing the 
same dependent variables on average log earnings between 1978 and 1981, and a dummy variable for 
whether a father is displaced in 1982.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep var:
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 
1995-99
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 
1995-99
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 
1995-99
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 







Father's Log Income 0.383 0.383 0.38 -0.047 -0.081
Residual [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.007] [0.004]
Father Displaced -0.086 -0.086 -0.088 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.026
[0.040] [0.039] [0.039] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
With Initial Firm
Characteristic Controls No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 57,683 57,683 57,683 57,683 59,681 59,681 59,681 59,681
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0 0.02
 
Table 3
Estimated Effects of Father's Displacement
on Child's Earnings, Unemployment and Social Assistance Receipt
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is child's log real earnings averaged between 1995 and 1999 after de-meaning by age. All regressions include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted
with gender. The initial firm characteristic controls include fixed effects for regional location of firm (18 possible characters that identify provinces and smaller regions in large provinces)
interacted with an indicator variable for whether the firm is in an urban or rural location.  The controls also include 11 industry categories and the median log wage of the initial firm in 1978.  Huber-
White standard errors are shown from clustering by father ID.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep var:
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 
1995-99
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 
1995-99
Age Adj. Log 
Earnings, 










Father's Log Income 0.383 0.368 0.365 -0.047 -0.053 -0.054 -0.081 -0.076 -0.074
Residual [0.023] [0.020] [0.023] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Father Displaced -0.086 -0.103 -0.094 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.026 0.033 0.028
[0.039] [0.041] [0.049] [0.012] [0.014] [0.017] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010]
With Initial Firm
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of initial industry F.E. 10 317 317 10 317 317 10 317 317
Number of initial region F.E. 36 36 180 36 36 180 36 36 180
Observations 57,683 57,683 57,683 59,681 59,681 59,681 59,681 59,681 59,681
R-squared 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.02 0.1 0.22
 
Table 4
Estimated Effects of Father's Displacement on Child's Outcomes
Conditional on Region and Industry Fixed Effects
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is child's log real earnings averaged between 1995 and 1999 after de-meaning by age. All regressions include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted with gender. The
initial firm characteristic controls include fixed effects for regional location of firm interacted with an indicator variable for whether the firm is in an urban or rural location. The controls also include 11 industry
categories and the median log wage of the initial firm in 1978.  Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by father ID. Table 5
Estimated Effects of Father's Displacement













-3 0 0.008 53.681 -0.011
[0.003] [0.008] [98.772] [0.006]
-2 0.001 0.003 -200.147 -0.015
[0.004] [0.009] [130.319] [0.006]
-1 0.001 0.006 -250.188 -0.01
[0.005] [0.010] [160.781] [0.006]
0 0.006 0.039 -265.791 0.233
[0.005] [0.010] [169.206] [0.012]
+1 0.007 0.04 -179.216 0.281
[0.006] [0.010] [180.592] [0.012]
+2 0.015 0.035 26.057 0.135
[0.007] [0.011] [190.868] [0.010]
+3 0.01 0.035 -32.187 0.112
[0.008] [0.011] [218.225] [0.010]
+4 0.007 0.034 -123.249 0.077
[0.008] [0.011] [222.071] [0.009]
+5 0.007 0.028 32.499 0.065
[0.009] [0.011] [251.133] [0.009]
+6 0.004 0.025 -67.235 0.06
[0.009] [0.011] [284.825] [0.009]
+7 0.004 0.02 -191.588 0.046
[0.009] [0.011] [287.696] [0.009]
+8 0.004 0.018 -19.425 0.055
[0.009] [0.011] [294.987] [0.010]
Observations 703885 703885 703885 703885
R-squared 0.6 0.69 0.76 0.28
Notes:   The regressors are individual fixed effects and indicator variables for 
years since job displacement for fathers in firms that closed (the omitted category 
is not displaced or no displacement for at least 3 years.  Table 6
Estimated Effects of Father's Displacement, Divorce, and Mobility









Log Income 1978-80 0.36 -0.045 -0.074
[0.026]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]***
Displacement -0.088 0.017 0.025
[0.044]** [0.013] [0.009]***
Father Divorced -0.204 0.017 0.078
[0.032]*** [0.010]* [0.007]***
Moved -0.027 -0.009 0.016
[0.025] [0.008] [0.006]***
Observations 703,885 703,885 703,885
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.02
Note: The dependent variables are is child's log real earnings 
averaged between 1995 and 1999 after de-meaning by age, a dummy 
for ever receiving UI between 1995 and 1999, and a dummy for ever 
receiving Social Assistance between 1995 and 1999.  All regressions 
include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted with gender. Controlling for Father' Income 1983-1988














Father's Log Income 0.376 0.158 -0.046 -0.02 -0.08 -0.038
Residual, 1978 - 1981 [0.024] [0.034] [0.007] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006]
Father Displaced -0.086 -0.027 0.018 0.004 0.026 0.009
[0.039] [0.039] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
Father's Log Income 0.224 -0.027 -0.043
Residual, 1983 - 1988 [0.022] [0.006] [0.004]
With Initial Firm
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57683 57683 59681 59681 59681 59681
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
 
Effects of Father's Income and Father Displacement
on Child's Earnings, Unemployment and Social Assistance Receipt
Table 7
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is child's log real earnings averaged between 1995 and 1999 after de-meaning by age. All regressions
include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted with gender, and firm characteristic controls for regional location of firm industry and the median log
wage of the initial firm in 1978.  Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by father ID. Income Quartile: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var:
Father's Log Income 0.381 0.405 0.359 0.298
[0.119] [0.210] [0.189] [0.068]
Father Displaced -0.191 -0.111 0.085 -0.09
[0.088] [0.087] [0.059] [0.070]
Father's Log Income 0.034 -0.030 -0.095 -0.170
[0.015] [0.070] [0.066] [0.026]
Father Displaced 0.067 0.026 -0.019 0.006
[0.026] [0.024] [0.022] [0.024]
Father's Log Income -0.017 -0.161 -0.158 -0.063
[0.011] [0.046] [0.039] [0.013]
Father Displaced 0.042 0.028 0.009 0.020
[0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.017]
Log Earnings
Receipt of UI
Receipt of Social Assistance
Table 8
Effects of Father's Income and Father Displacement
on Child's Earnings, Unemployment and Assistance Receipt
by Father's Income Quartile in 1978
Notes: The sample of fathers are split by income quartile based on average income between 1978 and
1981. The table shows results from regressions run separately by father's income quartile. All
regressions include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted with gender, and firm characteristic controls
for regional location of firm industry and the median log wage of the initial firm in 1978. Huber-White
standard errors are shown from clustering by father ID.  Log Son's Earnings Receipt of Receipt of
Earnings UI SA
Father's Residual 0.342 -0.072 -0.039
Log Income [0.021] [0.006] [0.004]
Father Displaced 0.008 -0.004 -0.001
[0.023] [0.007] [0.008]
Number of Obs. 39856 41197 41197
on Son's Earnings, Unemployment and Assistance Receipt
Father Displaced when Son Aged 19 to 21
Table 9
Effects of Father's Displacement in 1989
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for birth cohort interacted with gender, and
firm characteristic controls for regional location of firm industry and the median log wage
of the initial firm in 1978. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by
father ID.Table 10
Estimated Differences In Father's Characteristics Between Early Leavers and 
Displaced Workers
Log Father's Mother's Father's 
Income Earnings Age Unmarried
Left Early 0.019 -471.68 -0.404 -0.008
(0.02) (583.60) (0.27) (0.01)
Firm Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 59,730 60,277 60,277 60,277
R-squared 0.50 0.31 0.30 0.34
Table 11
IV and Reduced From Results including Early Leavers
Child'  Log Child on UI Child on
Income SA
Log Father's 0.288 -0.022 -0.044
Income (0.016) (0.004) (0.002)
Displaced in 1982 -0.08 0.016 0.015
(0.034) (0.009) (0.006)
First Stage:  Dependent Variable:  Log Father's  -0.001
                     Displaced in 1982 Income (0.001)
0.793
(0.008)